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INSURANCE PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM: ADDRESSING MISUNDERSTANDINGS
AND PROVIDING A VIEW FROM A DIFFERENT PARADIGM
JEFFREY

E. THOMAS*

of American International Group
spectacular
recent
HE
(AIG),
the world's
largestdemise
insurer,' has raised issues about insurance
regulation and its role in the financial crisis. As one who spends considerable time studying insurance law, I was very pleased to be invited to be part
of this symposium. Although I feel a little like a "fish out of water" surrounded by securities and banking experts, I hope that my insurance perspective on federal regulatory reform will be useful.
I have subtitled this Article "Addressing Misunderstandings and Providing a View from a Different Paradigm" because I believe that much of
the current call for federal regulatory reform of insurance is based on fundamental misunderstandings regarding AIG and the financial crisis, and
because insurance, which is regulated predominately at the state level,
provides a different, and potentially useful, regulatory paradigm. Part I of
this Article analyzes the role of insurance in the financial crisis. It exposes
the misunderstandings and explains how insurance had little, if any, role
in the crisis. Part II outlines the current, state-based regulatory paradigm
for insurance, and explains how this paradigm has become a barrier for
federal reform in the insurance area. Finally, Part III addresses the powerful role played by the courts in insurance regulation, and suggests that
financial regulatory reform could benefit from use of a similar model for
other financial services.

T

I.

INSURANCE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE FINANCIAL

CRisis

Although AIG is the largest and one of the strongest insurance com-

panies in the world, 2 its collapse was not an insurance regulatory failure.
Instead, AIG's collapse was caused by a non-insurance subsidiary's overinvestment in credit default swaps (CDS). While CDS are similar to insurance in certain respects, they were not insurance products and were not
* Associate Dean for International Programs, Professor of Law, University of
Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. I would like to thank Villanova University
School of Law for hosting the Symposium on Financial Regulatory Reform, and
Angela Dudley, Jane Francis, and Geoff Miller for able and expeditious research
assistance.
1. See Jerome A. Madden, A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit Default
Swaps Bring Down AIG and Lehman Brothers, 5 Bus. L. BRIEF 15, 15 (2008).
2. See id. at 15 & n.3. In its 2007 Annual Report, AIG reported assets of $1

trillion, operations in 130 countries, and some 70 million customers. See AIG 2007
(FoRM 10-K) 1, 5, 13 (2008) [hereinafter AIG ANNUAL REPORT),

ANNUAL REPORT

available at http://www.ezodproxy.com/AIG/2008/AR2007/HTML2/default.htm.

(773)
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subject to insurance regulation. Moreover, although some have suggested
that CDS should be regulated as insurance, to do so would undermine key
characteristics of CDS.
A.

AIG's Collapse Was Not an Insurance Failure

AIG's collapse was caused by overinvestment in CDS. By 2007, AIG's
Financial Products Corp., a London-based company that was created in
1987,3 had CDS on its books with a combined notional value of approximately $440 billion, 4 of which about $57 billion involved securities with
some exposure to sub-prime mortgages.5 Although "notional value" includes double counting and therefore is not an accurate portrayal of exposure, 6 this is a big number. It is more than four times the $95.8 billion in
AIG shareholder equity as of 2007 (the holding company, not just the Financial Products subsidiary). 7 It is also more than sixteen times the $26
billion in insurance surplus held by AIG in 2008.8 AIG was able to write
such a large amount of CDS with very little collateral because of its high
credit rating.9
AIG's huge exposure for CDS did not cause any problems until the
market started to decline. As long as there were no credit defaults or collateral calls, it was like free money. But when the housing market and the
related mortgage-backed securities began a serious decline in late 2007, it
began a chain reaction that led AIG to the brink of bankruptcy.1 0 While
the securities that were the subject of the AIG CDS were highly rated initially," the decline in the residential mortgage market caused a severe
3. See AIG FinancialProducts Corp. Releases Innovative Academic Research on Commodities, Bus. WiRE, July 11, 2007 [hereinafter Research on Commodities], available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOEIN/is_2007July_11/ai-n27301078/.
4. See Madden, supra note 1, at 16 (citing AIG ANNuAL REPORT (FoRm 10-Q),
supra note 2, at 87).
5. See id.

6. See id. (noting that notional value is "the face amount of the insured
debt"). This amount is inflated well beyond the actual risk because the face
amount of each CDS is included in the total value, but many CDS are providing
coverage for other CDS. In one report, the multiple counting amounted to 90%
of the notional value. See Peter Wallison, Comment, REGULATION, Fall 2009, at 37
(commenting on Lynn A. Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by DeregulatingThem, REGuLATIoN, Fall 2009, at 30).
7. See AIG ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
8. See Paul Walker-Bright & Timothy P. Law, AIG's FinancialDistress:How Credit
Default Swaps and the Lack of RegulationBrought Down an Insurance Giant and Implicationsfor the InsuranceIndustry, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL
ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAw § III.A.1 & n.79 (2009).
9. See David Henry, Matthew Goldstein & Carol Matlack, How AIG's Credit
Loophole Squeezed Europe's Banks, Bus. WK., Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://www.
businessweek.com/magazine/content/08-43/b4105032835044.htm.
10. See Madden, supra note 1, at 17.

11. See AIG Corporate Information, http://www.aigcorporate.com/aboutaig/
pre september 2008.html (last visited May 23, 2010) (explaining that many of
these securities were initially rated as AAA).
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decline in the value of the securities backed by the AIG CDS. 12 This decline resulted in demands for AIG to post additional collateral to support
the CDS. 13 Goldman Sachs, which held $20 billion in AIG CDS, demanded $1.5 billion in collateral in August 2007.14 AIG argued that this
amount of collateral was excessive, so the parties compromised and AIG
posted $450 million to Goldman in collateral.1 5 Goldman asked for additional collateral in October, resulting in another $1.5 billion posting. 16
With the additional exposure from the market, AIG began to write down
their CDS, which led to other holders of AIG CDS making collateral
calls. 17 In February 2008, AIG announced a $5.3 billion quarterly loss,
driven primarily by writing down CDS.18 In May 2008, AIG announced
another $7.8 billion quarterly loss again fueled by CDS write-downs.19 By
July 31, 2008, AIG had posted more than $16.5 billion in collateral for
CDS. 20
AIG's financial problems reached true crisis proportions in September 2008. Several things happened nearly simultaneously. On the news of
the continuing write-offs combined with a worsening market, rating agencies "slashed" AIG's credit rating.2 1 As a result, AIG was required to post
another $14 to $20 billion in collateral for CDS. 22 But it was virtually impossible for AIG to raise this capital. It had already raised some $24 billion
in collateral in the previous months,23 so it had exhausted ready sources
for capital. At about the same time, the bond markets "froze" on the news
that Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy.2 4 In addition, AIG's ability to raise capital in the equities market was undermined by a precipitous
drop in its share price from more than $70 per share to a fifty-two week
low of $1.25.25 AIG was poised for bankruptcy. Rather than risk the impact this would have on the world financial markets, 26 the federal govern12. See id.
13. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG's Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass
Real-World Test, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at Al.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.

22. See AIG Corporate Information, supra note 11 (stating that AIG posted

$20 billion in collateral for CDS); cf Nannette Byrnes, Where AIG Went Wrong, Bus.
WK., Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/
content/08_39/b4101040078511.htm (stating that AIG posted $14.5 billion in collateral); Mollenkamp et al., supra note 13 (stating that AIG posted $18 billion in
collateral).
23. See Byrnes, supra note 22.
24. See Mollenkamp et al., supra note 13.
25. See id.; see also Byrnes, supra note 22.
26. See Mollenkamp et al., supra note 13.
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ment stepped in with an initial $85 billion loan,27 which was shortly
thereafter increased to $123 billion,28 and then to $150 billion.29
AIG's collapse was not an insurance problem. The entity responsible
for AIG's CDS business, AIG Financial Products Corp., was not an insurance company.30 Sales of CDS were not subject to insurance regulation.3 1
As derivatives, CDS were covered by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,32 which allowed for speculation in CDS3 3 and was one
reason for the market's exceptional growth.34 AIG's insurance businesses
were capitalized as separate entities and maintained appropriate reserves
for the insurance claims.3 5
B.

CDS Are Not Insurance

Even though CDS are not subject to insurance regulation, some have
argued that CDS had the essential features of insurance.3 6 This argument
is based on the risk-transfer aspect of CDS. Because the seller of the CDS
takes on the risk of a credit default, the buying party has "insurance" in
the ordinary sense of the word against a default.37 But this risk transfer
27. See AIG Corporate Information, supra note 11.
28. See Mollenkamp et al., supra note 13.
29. See Walker-Bright & Law, supra note 8, § II.B.3 & n.73.
30. See Research on Commodities, supra note 3; see also Madden, supra note 1, at

16 & n.20. The holding company became subject to the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in 1999 when OTS approved its application to charter AIG Bank. See
Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Approves AIG Acquisition of
American General Bank (Aug. 1, 2001), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/771
52.html.
31. See Madden, supra note 1, at 16 & n.20; William K Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG
Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943, 988 (2009). See generally Robert F. Schwartz,
Risk Distribution in the CapitalMarkets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of
Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 167 (2007).
32. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 app. E (codified as amended in scat-

tered sections of 7, 8, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).

33. See Walker-Bright & Law, supra note 8, § II.B.1; Schwartz, supra note 31, at
171-72; Sjostrom, supra note 31, at 983-87.
34. SeeJohn T. Lynch, Comment, CreditDerivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants
Need for Direct Regulatory Intervention-A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55
BuFF. L. REv. 1371, 1376-82 (2008).
35. See Eric Dinallo, What I Learned at the AIG Meltdown, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3,
2010, at A17. Nevertheless, while the separate insurance entities remained financially sound throughout the crisis, the interconnectedness between the insurance
subsidiaries and other AIG companies put the insurance companies at some risk if
AIG had gone into bankruptcy. See Walker-Bright & Law, supra note 8, § III.A.
36. See, e.g., id. § II.B.1 & n.31; Arthur Kimball-Stanley, Note, Insurance and
Credit Default Swaps: Should Like Things Be Treated Alike?, 15 CoNN. INs. L.J. 241
(2008).

37. Credit default swaps have been described in the following way:
A credit default swap is a contract, in which one party pays a "premium"
over a set time period to the other party in exchange for the other party's
promise that it will pay the buyer in the event that a credit event, like a
default on a loan or a credit rating downgrade, occurs.
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fundamentally is not insurance." These sorts of risk transfers are all
around us. A money-back guaranty, for example, transfers the risk of dissatisfaction from the consumer to the retailer. A disclaimer that a garage
operator is not responsible for damage to a parked car transfers risk from
the operator to the car owner. The limitation on liability for credit card
fraud to a specified amount transfers risk from the cardholder to the issuer. None of these risk transfers are insurance.3 9
What makes insurance different from these other transactions is that
insurance both transfers and distributes or pools a risk.40 The classic example is fire insurance. The risk is transferred from the owner to the insurer,
and then because the insurer issues thousands of policies to similarly situated owners, the risk is distributed or pooled. Each individual home only
has a small probability of burning down. By each owner contributing a
relatively small amount to the pool, when one house out of the thousands
in the pool actually does burn down, there are sufficient resources
(reserves) in the pool to pay to rebuild the insured house.
CDS do not have this pooling dimension. They are unregulated,
over-the-counter derivatives.41 Each transaction is individually negotiated
and may or may not result in pooling. 42 While a specific issuer like AIG
might choose to issue CDS on multiple credit risks and thereby achieve
some level of pooling, that is not a necessary prerequisite of the product.
In addition, as the experience with AIG shows, combining similar risks by
selling many CDS actually increased the risk rather than distributing or
pooling that risk. These risks are influenced by market changes, so that a
drop in the bond market, for example, increases the risk of default (and
collateral calls) for all CDS related to bonds, not just those of a particular
bond issuer.
Instead of "pooling" a risk, CDS are used to "hedge" risks. A hedging
device is one that counterbalances another risk in a portfolio. 43 Thus, for
example, if an oil buyer is worried that the price of oil will increase, it may
buy futures on oil that will lock in a certain price, transferring the risk of
an increase to the seller of the futures contract. The seller of the futures
contract uses the risk of an increase in oil prices to offset some other risk
in the portfolio. Although the other risk could be many different things, a
Walker-Bright & Law, supra note 8, § II.B.1; see also Schwartz, supra note 31, at 181
(applying dictionary definitions of insurance to CDS).
38. For a detailed analysis of how CDS are different from insurance using a
contract and market analysis, see Schwartz, supra note 31.
39. See 1 Robert H. Jerry, II, What Is Insurance?, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAw LIBRARY EDITION § 1.03[1] (Jeffrey E. Thomas ed., 2009).
40. See id. § 1.03[2].
41. See Schwartz, supra note 31; see also Madden, supra note 1; Sjostrom, supra
note 31.
42. See Walker-Bright & Law, supra note 8, § II.B.1 (defining credit default
swap).

43. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 220-21 (2008) (explaining how hedging can be used with CDSs to diversify risk).
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simple example would be the risk that oil prices would drop. By locking in
the price for future oil sales, the seller has hedged against the risk of a
price drop. Because the locked-in price will be above the current market
price, but below the anticipated future price, the risk has been "balanced."
This balancing, of course, is often much more sophisticated than my
example. In the case of CDS, the seller of the CDS might hedge against
the default by buying stock (or stock options) of a competitor of the reference entity (the company issuing the debt instrument covered by the
CDS). For example, if AIG has given CDS on bonds issued by General
Motors, the risk of GM defaulting on its bonds could be offset by AIG
buying options on Ford stock, which would increase in value in the event
of a GM default. The problem was that AIG did not properly hedge its
CDS risk.4 4 Goldman Sachs, which held billions in debt instruments covered by AIG CDS, did a better job of hedging. When Goldman learned
that AIG may have trouble providing the requested collateral, Goldman
bought CDS on the risk that AIG would default. 45
Goldman's purchase of CDS on AIG illustrates another major difference between CDS and insurance-CDS are freely bought and sold. 46 Because CDS are a derivative instrument that is essentially unregulated,
holders of the CDS could sell them to others. The buying and selling
resulted in holders of CDS that did not have any other relationship to the
underlying debt. This would not be allowed in the insurance world, where
the holders of insurance must have an "insurable interest" in the thing
being insured. 47 The sales of CDS can happen by either issuers or holders. While the resale of insurance policies is not specifically forbidden
under insurance regulations, apart from sales of entire companies or divisions, such sales are contrary to the custom and practice of the industry
because of the time and effort that goes into the underwriting process. 4 8
Once an insurer has made the investment to determine whether a risk
should be insured, it is generally inclined to hold on to that risk (the policy), and it would be suspicious of any insurer trying to sell its insured risks
to others. The obvious implication would be that the risk was worse than
expected, so a buyer would be unlikely to buy it without a deep discount.

44. See Madden, supra note 1, at 16-17.

45. See Mollenkamp et al., supra note 13.
46. See Walker-Bright & Law, supra note 8,

§ II.B.1.

47. See 1Jerry, supra note 39, § 1.05[3]. Some commentators have suggested
that CDS should be limited to those holders who have an insurable interest. See,

e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, DisparateRegulatory Schemes for ParallelActivities: Securities
Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REv. BANKINC &
FIN. L. 375, 426 (2005).

48. This is sometimes known as the doctrine that an insurance policy is a "per-

sonal contract." See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 191-92.
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InsuranceRegulation Is Poorly Suited for CDS

These differences between CDS and insurance make the insurance
regulatory model poorly suited to CDS regulation. Because insurance is a
pooling mechanism, one of the primary objectives of regulation is to protect that pool so claims can be paid. This is done through financial solvency regulation. 49 As part of that regulation, insurers are to maintain
capital sufficient to address the insurer's collective risks.50 Unfortunately,
insurers have nowhere near the amount of capital it would take to collectively stand behind CDS. Estimates of the total notional value for CDS
peaked at around $60 trillion.51 This is a gargantuan number, nearly four
times the GDP of the United States. 52 Insurers obviously do not have
enough capital to underwrite the full CDS market. Indeed, the total outstanding surplus for the property/casualty insurance industry in the
United States at the end of 2008 was $455.6 billion. 55 Thus, the notional
value of CDS was about 100 times the combined property/casualty surplus.
A second reason that insurance regulation is not suitable for CDS is
that it would not allow the market mechanism to function. As noted
above, insurance regulation generally has an insurable interest requirement.5 4 This requirement would interfere with the buying and selling of
CDS because few secondary buyers would have an insurable interest in the
underlying debt instrument. In addition, the insurable interest requirement would limit the use of CDS as a hedging mechanism. Buyers may
want to use CDS to hedge against a counterbalancing risk even though
they are not directly exposed to the risk covered by the CDS. This kind of
access to a resale market also allows much broader access to capital because any investor in the market can take on the CDS risk (or for that
matter, transfer the risk to someone else).
A third reason that insurance regulation is not suitable for CDS is that
regulators simply do not have the expertise. CDS are a relatively new financial instrument, developed by finance experts. Insurance regulators
would have a steep learning curve, which would be compounded by the
49. See 2 Gary M. Cohen, The Framework of Insurance Regulation, in NEW APsupra note 39, § 8.02[d]. For more
detail about solvency regulation, see 2 Gary A. Hernandez & Paige D. Waters, Insurance Solvency Regulation, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAw LIBRARY EDITION,
supra note 39, § 14.
50. See 2 Cohen, supra note 49, § 8.02 [2] [d] [ii].
51. See Madden, supra note 1, at 15; see also OTC DerivativesMarket Activity in the
Second Half of 2007, BIS MONETARY & ECON. DEP'T (Bank for Int'l Settlements,
Basel, Switz.), May 2008, at 1, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc-hy0805.
PLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAw LIBRARY EDITION,

pdf.
52. See Madden, supra note 1, at 15.
53. See Robert P. Hartwig, 2008, YEAR END RESULTS (Ins. Information Inst.,
N.Y., N.Y.), Apr. 9, 2009, available at http://www.iii.org/FinancialResultsand

MarketConditions/Commentary-on-2008-Year-End-Results.html.
54. See ERIC MIus HOLMES, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §§ 174.02-.03 (2d ed.
2006).
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fact that financial risk is substantially different than other kinds of risks
covered by insurance.5 5 Furthermore, insurance regulation, done in fifty
different states, is slow and cumbersome compared to the speed at which
things happen in the market.
II.

THE STATE-BASED REGULATORY PARADIGM FOR INSURANCE

Although CDS are not insurance and AIG's collapse did not involve
insurance, many are using the occasion to promote reform of insurance
regulation.56 The most commonly suggested reform is the adoption of an
optional federal charter that would allow insurers to opt out of the state
regulatory system. 5 7 Although support for the optional federal charter has
grown in the wake of the AIG debacle,5 8 a comprehensive and entrenched
state regulatory system will not be easy to displace. Because so much of
the financial regulatory system is federal,5 9 most people naturally think
55. See Walker-Bright & Law, supra note 8, § III.C.3.
56. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Both Sides of the Aisle See More Regulation, and NotJust
of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A15; Peter Whoriskey, AIG Bailout Revives
Calls for a FederalRegulator,WASH. PosT, Sept. 30, 2008, at D03; Tom Wilson, Regulate Me Please, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 2009, at A29; see also Trade Groups Applaud Fed
Action on AIG, Bus. INS., Sept. 17, 2008 (reporting statement from American Insurance Association arguing that AIG situation highlights need for insurance regulatory reform). These calls for regulation have resulted in congressional hearings.
See, e.g., Perspectives on Modernizing Insurance Regulation: HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009); The Causes and Effects of
AIG's Bailouts: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th
Cong. (2008).

57. See, e.g., Sean P. Carr, The AIG Effect: AIG Impact on State/FederalDebate Unclear, BESTWIRE, Sept. 8, 2009; Lori Widmer, Is Now the Time for the OptionalFederal
Charter?, RISK MANAGEMENT, June 1, 2009, at 26; see also infra note 59. For scholarly

analysis of the optional federal charter, see Scott A. Sinder, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley

Act and State Regulation of the Business of Insurance-Past,Present and ... Future?, 5
N.C. BANKING INsT. 49 (2001); Danielle F. Waterfield, Insurers jump on Train for
FederalInsurance Regulation: Is It Really What They Want or Need?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J.
283 (2002); William J. Warfel, Insurance Regulatory Reform: An Evaluation of Options
for Expanding the Role of the Federal Government (Networks Fin. Inst. Working Paper
No. 2006-WP-11, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=946457; Martin F. Grace & Hal S. Scott, Optional Federal Chartering
of Insurance: Rationale and Design of a Regulatory Structure (June 26, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the GSU/Brookings/AEI Conference, "The
Future of Insurance Regulation," in Wash., D.C. on July 9, 2008), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1175104.
58. See, e.g., AIG Bailout Heightens Need for OFC, REACTIONs, Aug. 2009; Sean P.
Carr, AIG Bailout Makes Case for OFC, ProponentsArgue, BESTWIRE, Sept. 8, 2009;
Mark A. Hofmann, White House Eyes Regulatory Revamp: Better Control Over Systemic
Risk Sought; Boost for OFC Seen, Bus. INS., Mar. 30, 2009; Arthur D. Postal, AIG's New
Failure Makes Federal Regulation Likely, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 13, 2008, at 42;
Arthur D. Postal, AIG Shows Feds Should Regulate Insurance, Paulson Says, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 6.
59. SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-FergusonAct of
1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role of InsuranceRegulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 13, 13
(1993) ("Among major financial institutions in the United States, only insurance
firms are subject to plenary state regulation.").
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about regulatory reform in terms of the federal system. Insurance, however, has developed a regulatory paradigm at the state level, which will be
described in this section. We begin with a brief historical introduction,
followed by a description of the scope and approach to state insurance
regulation. The next subsection describes the development and functioning of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a
sort of "trade group" for state insurance regulators that works to improve
(and protect) the state insurance regulatory system. The final subsection
considers the lessons to be learned from the state regulatory paradigm.
A.

Historical Context: How Did We Come to the State Regulatory Paradigm?

Insurance regulation began at a time when the federal government
was relatively weak and not significantly involved in the regulation of commerce. It is difficult to pinpoint a precise time when state insurance regulation began, but it was well underway before the Civil War. In the late
1700s and early 1800s, state regulation was done directly through the legislature or by putting conditions on corporate charters.60 By the 1820s,
6
some states were requiring insurers to report to a state official. I In the
1850s, states began to give regulatory power to a board or a designated
insurance official.6 2 From the 1850s, state insurance regulation was
"steadily extended and systematized." 63
1.

The U.S. Supreme Court Holds that Insurance Is Not Commerce

This early state regulation was insulated from federal interference in
64
1868 by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Paulv. Virginia. That case
involved a challenge to a Virginia statute requiring insurance companies
to post a bond as a condition of licensing, and making it illegal to sell
insurance without a license.6 5 A New York insurance agent was convicted
under the statute for selling insurance policies of an insurer licensed in
New York, but not Virginia. 66 The agent contended that the Virginia statute violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce
Clause. The Court rejected both arguments. It held that corporations
60. See Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary
Inquiry in the Theory of InsuranceLaw, 45 MINN. L. REv 471, 473 (1960).

61. See id. For example, in New York insurers were required to report to the
state comptroller, and in Massachusetts they were required to make reports to the
state treasurer. See N.Y. Rev. Stat. tit. 21, § 4 (1829); see also MAss. GEN. LAws ch.
141 (1827).
62. See Kimball, supranote 60, at 473-74; see also, e.g., 1852 Mass. Acts ch. 231,

§ 5; 1859 N.Y. Laws ch. 366; 1851 N.H. Laws ch. 1111; 1854 R.I. Pub. Laws 17, § 17;
1852 Vt. Acts & Resolves no. 45, § 15; 1852 Vt. Acts & Resolves no. 46, § 16.
63. See Kimball, supra note 60, at 473.
64. 75 U.S. 168 (1868); see also 2 Cohen, supra note 49, § 8.01 [1].
65. See Paul, 75 U.S. at 170.
66. See id. at 169.
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were not "citizens" entitled to protection of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause,67 and that insurance was not commerce. The opinion states:
Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.
The policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss by
fire, entered into between the corporations and the assured, for a
consideration paid by the latter. These contracts are not articles
of commerce in any proper meaning of the word. 68
This opinion was upheld and prevented federal regulation of insurance
for some seventy-five years. 69
In the period after Paul, the insurance industry experienced extreme
boom and bust cycles. It took little capital to start up an insurance company, and because the obligation to pay was contingent and in the future,
start-up insurers could generate significant revenue and profits by selling
low-cost insurance.70 Unfortunately, when catastrophic losses were incurred, as in the case of large-scale urban fires in the 1870s, many insurers
were unable to pay policyholder claims and became insolvent.7 1 One report in 1877 suggested that of the 4,000 insurance companies that had
been started in the United States, only twenty-five percent, or 1,000 of
them, remained.7 2
2.

Insurers Respond by Reducing Competition

The bust part of the cycles encouraged insurers to find a way to avoid
so many insolvencies. The initial answer was the creation of national insurance ratemaking boards, but competition led to regional compacts designed to set rates through local agents. 7 3 The regional compacts
prevented insolvencies, but also were anticompetitive. Anti-compact legislation was introduced in various states, but it either did not pass or was
ineffective.74 By the early 1900s, states began to introduce insurance rate
regulation.75 This regulation was relatively ineffective. 7 6
67. See id. at 176.

68. Id. at 183.
69. See 2 Cohen, supra note 49, § 8.01 [1]; see also, e.g., Nat'l Union Life Ins.
Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922); Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S.

132 (1918); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913).

70. See Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance
Rate Regulation: The McCarran-FergusonAct in HistoricalPerspective, 56 MICH. L. REV.

545, 547-48 (1958).

71. See id. at 548.
72. See PROCEEDINGS
ERS'

ASSOCIATION

OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE FIRE UNDERWRIT-

17 (1877).
73. See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 70, at 548-49.
74. See id. at 549-51.
OF THE NORTHWEST

75. See id. at 551-52; see also, e.g., 1909 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 152, p. 279.
76. Kimball & Boyce summarize the situation in this way:

Thus, in 1944 fifteen states either had no control over insurance rates, or

the unsophisticated anti-monopoly provisions which did not regulate rate
making but rather sought to preserve competition. In the other thirty-
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The weak regulatory environment combined with industry efforts to
maintain solvency by reducing competition and increasing prices set the
stage for reconsideration of the federal role for insurance regulation. Insurers became more comfortable with collusion, and increasingly took advantage of the lack of competition. Most states allowed the insurers to
increase rates as requested.7 7 Missouri, however, was an exception.7 8 In
the late 1930s, the Missouri Superintendent of Insurance refused to authorize the requested rate increases, and he was sued by some 139 insurers.7 9 While the case was pending, the difference between the old and
proposed new rates was collected and deposited with the court.8 0 The
Superintendent, a member of the Kansas City political "machine," negotiated a compromise whereby the insurers received eighty percent of the
deposited money, but the other twenty percent went to the state.8 1 The
state attorney general complained about this "bribe" to the Department of
Justice, which undertook antitrust investigations into the industry.82
3.

The U.S. Supreme Court Permits Federal Regulation

In 1942, the Department of Justice investigations led to grand jury
indictments for violations of the Sherman Act, conspiracy to fix insurance
rates, and monopolization of trade fire insurance.8 3 The South-Eastern
Underwriters Association, a cooperative rating bureau, and its ninety-eight
members selling insurance in six states were subject to the indictments. 8 4
The allegations were supported by evidence that the members of the association controlled ninety percent of the market, fixed premiums rates and
commissions, and enforced participation in the arrangement by boycotts
and other kinds of coercion and intimidation.8 5 These efforts resulted in
three states there was rate regulatory machinery, usually coupled with
anti-monopoly provisions. The effectiveness of control varied from
purely paper machinery in some states to relatively complete and effective
control in others like New York, and direct state rate making in Texas.
Even in states with fairly effective control in leading lines of insurance
like fire and workmen's compensation, the control was relatively ineffective or altogether lacking in other lines. It might be a reasonably accurate generalization to say that in 1944, though ostensibly there was
control in two-thirds of the states, insurance rate making was as yet largely
uncontrolled in the United States.
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 70, at 552 (internal citations omitted).
77. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
625, 632 (1999).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 633.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). For a
more complete description of the opinion, see 2 Nathaniel S. Shapo, Regulation of
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exceptionally low loss ratios. During the ten years prior to the indictment,
the members collected some $488 million in premiums, of which only
86
The district
$215 million were used to pay losses in the same period.
87
In
court, based on Paul and its progeny, dismissed the indictments.
88
the Supreme Court
United States v. South-Eastern Undenriters Ass'n,

reversed.
89
Although asserting that the Court was not overruling Paul, the majority, in a sweeping opinion written by Justice Black, held that insurance
was interstate commerce subject to federal regulation the same as other
businesses. The Court found that insurance "holds a commanding position in the trade and commerce" of the United States, was "one of the
largest and most important branches of commerce," and that "[p]erhaps
no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in all
walks of life." 90 It then reasoned that congressional power to regulate
commerce was "essential" to an "indivisible Nation," and that "[n]o commercial enterprise .

.

. which conducts its business across state lines has

been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of
insurance." 9 1
The dissent by Justice Jackson foreshadowed congressional reaction.
92
Although he was sympathetic to the constitutional argument, he criticized the majority opinion on practical grounds: "The Court's decision at
the very least will require an extensive overhauling of state legislation relating to taxation and supervision. "9 In addition, the Court's decision gave
Congress responsibility for regulating interstate insurance transactions,

Rates and Risk Classification,in NEw APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAw LIBRARY EDITION,
supra note 39, § 11.02[3][b].
86. See Se. Underniters,322 U.S. at 542. This is a loss ratio of about 44%.
87. See id. at 537-38.
88. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
89. See id. at 545. The Court reasoned that it was refusing to strike down an
Act of Congress (the Sherman Act) rather than refusing to uphold another state
law. See id.
90. Id. at 539-40. In making this point, the Court noted that the total assets
held by United States insurance companies exceeded $37 billion, which was approximately "the equivalent of the value of all farm lands and building in the
United States." Id. at 540. It also noted that annual premium receipts exceeded
"$6 billion, more than the average annual revenue receipts of the United States
Government." Id.
91. Id. at 552.
92. See id. at 586 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Were we considering the question
for the first time and writing upon a clean slate, I would have no misgivings about
holding that insurance business is commerce, and, where conducted across state
lines, is interstate commerce, and therefore that congressional power to regulate
prevails over that of the states.").
93. Id. at 590.
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something that Congress had not asked for and for which it had virtually
no experience or expertise. 9 4
4.

State Regulation Given Preference by the McCarran-FergusonAct

In the year following the Court's decision, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act.9 5 State officials were concerned that their entire
regulatory structure, and a significant source of state revenue through premium taxes, was at risk.9 6 Consensus between state regulators, who
wanted to keep insurance regulation, and federal officials, who had no
experience or expertise, quickly developed.9 "
The Act, hurriedly
drafted,9 8 is only 415 words long. The key provisions provide:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.9 9

No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax
upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.1 00
This preference for state law, however, did not on its own invalidate
the Supreme Court's decision in South-Eastern Underwriters. The law cre-

ated a three-year window of opportunity to provide additional insurance
regulation. The Act provided that the Sherman and Clayton Acts, and
regulation by the Federal Trade Commission, "shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
state law."' 0 ' Thus, the states were left to provide the regulation that
would displace and "reverse preempt" federal law.' 0 2 Although their motives were "undoubtedly mixed, combining in varying proportions the desire to improve the quality and scope of state regulation of insurance
94. See id. ("The recklessness of such a course is emphasized when we consider that Congress has not one line of legislation deliberately designed to take
over responsibility for this important and complicated enterprise.").
95. Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10111015 (2006)). For a description of the legislative history of the Act, see R.K Powers, A Year of S.E.U.A., 23 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 317 (1945).
96. See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 70, at 554.
97. See id. at 554-55.
98. See Powers, supra note 95, at 324-25.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1011.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
101. Id.
102. See 2 Shapo, supra note 85,

§ 11.02[3][b].
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rating, the desire to enable insurance companies to escape the provisions
of the federal statutes, and the desire to maintain intact state control and
taxation of the insurance business,"103 the states responded to this oppor04
tunity by adopting concerted rate regulation in virtually every state.I
B.

State Insurance Regulation

State insurance regulation is done through a comprehensive administrative structure that goes well beyond rate regulation. All states have
some form of an insurance commissioner or an office of insurance, which
05
Statutes and
has administrative authority to issue rules and regulations.
licensing of
covers
that
system
regulatory
a
to
create
combine
regulations
and
conduct,
market
taxes,
premium
prices,
insurers, policy forms,
solvency.
1.

Licensing of Insurers

State regulation of insurance begins with licensure of insurance companies. Although there are some exceptions for "surplus lines" of insurance that do not require state licensure,10 6 the vast majority of insurance
sold in a state must be issued by insurers licensed in the state ("domestic"
insurers) or by insurers authorized to do business in the state licensed
elsewhere ("non-domestic admitted" insurers). 10 7 To obtain a license, an
insurer must meet certain capital requirements,10 8 obtain approval of its
officers and directors, its financial plan, its business plan, and provide an
actuarial justification. 0 9 Insurance intermediaries are also subject to li0
censing and supervision."
A licensed insurer is subject to comprehensive supervisory authority
of the state regulators."' State regulators have the authority to inspect
the insurer's records," 2 issue subpoenas to review company documents,
and compel testimony." 3 Insurers must submit quarterly and annual financial statements to the regulators,11 4 and insurers must meet capital or
surplus requirements, or in some cases must provide a custodial account
103. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 70, at 555.
104. See id. at 555-56.
105. See 2 Cohen, supra note 49, ch. 8.
106. See 2 Julie Mix McPeak, Licensing of Insurers, in NEW
ANCE LAw LIBRARY EDTHON, supra note 39, § 9.09.
107. See id. § 9.02.
108. See id. § 9.01 [1].

APPLEMAN ON INSUR-

109. See id. § 9.01 [2], [4].
110. See generally 2 Randall Doctor & Robert J. Cerny, Regulation of Insurance
Intermediaries, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAw LIBRARY EDTHON, supranote 39.
111. See 2 McPeak, supra note 106, § 9.06.
112. See id. § 9.06[1].
113. See id. § 9.06[2].
114. See id. § 9.06[3].
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or make a special deposit with the insurance department.1 1 5 The state
regulators also supervise and impose requirements regarding insurers'
investments.' 1 6
Control of the licensing also provides regulators with a system for administrative sanctions. Licenses may be revoked or suspended for violations of state insurance requirements,1 1 7 including violation of market
conduct regulations.' 1 8 Such sanctions are subject to an administrative
adjudication procedure.' 19 If an insurer becomes insolvent or starts to get
into financial trouble, the regulators can increase their supervision and, if
necessary, intervene in the insurer's operations. 120
The regulatory patchwork created by state licensing requirements is
one of the main justifications for the proposed optional federal charter for
insurance. Large insurers that conduct business in multiple states would
prefer to have a single federal regulator rather than being subject to this
maze of state regulation, which can be inconsistent or conflicting at
times.1 21
2.

Approval of Policy Forms

State regulators also have the power to regulate the forms used for
insurance policies.' 2 2 This power is reflected in statutes and regulations,
and is exercised through administrative review and informational directives from the insurance department.123 Some states require that forms be
approved prior to their use, but regulatory reforms in many states allow
forms to be used once a specified time has passed (generally a matter of
days) after the proposed form has been filed with the insurance department.1 2 4 A few states are even more liberal, and allow the use of policy
forms so long as it is filed within a certain period of time after the form is
first used. 125 There are some exceptional circumstances in which form
filing requirements do not apply. 126
115. See id. § 9.06[4].
116. See id.
117. See id. § 9.07[1]-[2].
118. See 2 A. Kenneth Levine, Market Conduct Regulation, in NEw APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE LAw LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 39, § 13.04[3] [e].
119. See 2 McPeak, supra note 106, § 9.07[3].
120. See id. § 9.07[4]; see also 2 Hernandez & Waters, supra note 49,
§ 14.05[4].
121. See 2 McPeak, supra note 106, § 9.10[4]; see also INS. INFORMATION INST.,
OPrIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER (2010), available at http://www.iii.org/media/hot
topics/insurance/opt/.
122. See generally 2 Carrie E. Cope, Regulation of Policy Forms, in NEW APPLEMAN
ON INSURANCE LAw LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 39.
123. See id. §§ 10.2, 10.3[2].
124. See id. § 10.04[1].
125. See id.
126. See id. § 10.06. These exceptions include some large commercial risks,
unique risks, and manuscript policies. See id.
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Prices

Regulation of insurance prices is one of the more controversial regulatory issues. States take a fairly broad range of approaches-from states
that mandate prices to states that allow open competition with no price
regulation.12 7 Few states are at either extreme. Most states take a middleground approach that is similar to the regulation of policy forms. They
allow rates to be changed by file-and-use or by use-and-file systems. Under
these systems, the insurer does not have to obtain approval for rate
changes before using them, but the state retains the authority to disapprove rates. 128
The public policy debate about the utility and appropriateness of
price regulation is ongoing. Illinois is the one state that does not have rate
regulation for personal lines of insurance, and its insurance commissioner
reports favorable results. 129 California is often used as a counterexample.
It has become more stringent in rate regulation in recent years through
the initiative process that has required insurance rate reductions, and its
proponents argue that those measures have been successful. 13 0 Federal
regulation is not likely to resolve this debate, or even take sides in it, be127. See 2 Shapo, supra note 85,

§ 11.02[4] [c]; see also Macey & Miller, supra

note 59.
128. See 2 Shapo, supra note 85, § 11.02 [4] [c].
129. See id. § 11.02 [4] [e]; see also Working with State Regulators to Increase Insurance Choices for Consumers: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on CapitalMarkets, Insurance,
and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services,, 108th
Cong. 154, 157 (2004) (statement of Philip R. O'Connor, Ph.D., former Illinois
Director of Insurance) [hereinafter Insurance Choices Hearings]. Discussing the Illinois approach, Dr. O'Connor stated:
The Illinois Model is simple and requires minimal regulatory resources.
It creates a climate that attracts the largest share of operating P&C companies . . . of any state in the nation and has been the key reason that
periods of inadequate supply in any line of coverage have tended to be
short....
Researchers have repeatedly compared Illinois to other states in
...
terms of important outcomes and Illinois consistently fares well. Auto
and homeowners insurance prices are always right in the middle of all
states, residual market populations have been perennially low, over-thephone price quotes are readily available in personal lines, the state has
the largest number of licensed personal lines insurers and the Illinois
Insurance Department has been able to devote resources to professionalizing its capabilities.
Insurance Choices Hearings,supra.
130. See 2 Shapo, supra note 85, § 11.02[4] [e]; see also J. ROBERT HUNTER,
CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, WHY NOT THE BEST?: THE MosT EFFECTIVE
AUro INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE NATION 12 (2001), available at http://www.

consumerwatchdog.org/documents/7634.pdf. (stating that California's Proposition 103 "reduced all automobile, homeowner, business, and most other propertycasualty insurance rates and premiums to the levels in effect on November 8, 1987,
then required that they be reduced a further 20%").

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss3/8

16

Thomas: Insurance Perspectives on Federal Financial Regulatory Reform: Ad

2010]

INSURANCE PERSPECTIVES

789

cause the federal proposals leave the pricing of insurance to the state
regulators.13 1
4.

Premium Taxes

Prices charged for insurance in the United States also include a premium tax imposed by the states. These taxes are an important source of
revenue to the states, and are one of the key motivations for states to retain regulatory authority over insurance.13 2 As with any taxing system, especially one that is more than 150 years old, 133 the system has become
more complex over time. In addition to the methods used to calculate the
taxes, 134 the system has developed a number of credits, deductions, and
offsets.' 35 The system also has to address its interaction with related tax
systems, such as corporate income or franchise taxes.' 3 6 As the tax system
became more sophisticated, insurers and policyholders developed arrangements designed to reduce state insurance premium tax liability.' 37
One of the unique developments concerning premium taxes is the
use of so-called retaliatory taxes.' 3 8 These are premium taxes meant to
equalize the difference in premium taxes from state to state. When a domestic insurer is subject to a premium tax in another state, if that tax rate
is higher than the domestic premium tax, the home state "retaliates"
against the other state by charging a higher premium tax for those insurers from that state.' 3 9 This complex system has developed because of the
differential taxes charged by states. The constitutionality of these retalia131. See Eli Lehrer, Federal Optional Charterfor Insurers: FAQ CEI ON PoINT
(Competitive Enterprise Inst., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2, 2007, available at http://cei.
org/pdf/6170.pdf.
132. See 2 Brian T. Casey & R. Dean Conlin, State InsurancePremium and Other
Insurance Taxes, in NEw APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAw LIBRARY EDITION, supranote

39, ch. 12 Abstract. In 2008, premium taxes amounted to $15.7 billion, which is
approximately 2% of all state revenues. See id. That may seem like a small amount,
but for comparison it is noteworthy that corporate income taxes produce only
6.5% of the state tax revenues. See id. One of the benefits of premium taxes is that
they tend to be more stable and consistent than income taxes. See id.
133. The first taxes were imposed in 1832 in Massachusetts. See Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 709 N.E.2d 1096 (Mass. 1999). Originally, the
taxes were to pay for insurance regulation, but now most states use premium taxes
as part of their general revenue. See 2 Casey & Conlin, supra note 132, § 12.01 [1].
134. See id. § 12.02.

135. See id. § 12.03. For example, Georgia grants insurers tax abatements for
localized investments. See GA. CODE ANN.

§ 33-8-5 (2000). Some states provide

insurers a reduction in premium tax with a salary tax credits for local employees.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-252d (Supp. 2009); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12B8.001 (2002). Many states that adopted the NAIC Model Acts allow premium tax

credits for assessments paid to state insurance guaranty funds. See, e.g., COLo. REV.
STAT. § 10-20-113 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-38-22; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.36160 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 404-B:16 (LexisNexis 1998).
136. See 2 Casey & Conlin, supra note 132, § 12.01 [6].
137. See id. § 12.06.
138. See generally id. § 12.09.
139. See id. § 12.09[1].
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tory taxes generally has been upheld.140 It has also given rise to its own
reporting and payment system.14 1 Although the federal government does
not impose premium taxes on U.S. insurers, 14 2 a federal excise tax applies
to foreign insurers. 143
5.

Market Conduct

State insurance regulators have comprehensive power over insurers'
market conduct, which is broad enough to include conduct with both consumers and competitors. Shortly after the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the NAIC prepared and approved a model unfair trade practices
act.144 All states have adopted some version of the model act.' 45 These
acts are considered remedial in nature and are broadly construed.1 46 Regulators have the power to undertake market conduct examinations of insurers.1 47 These market conduct examinations generally focus on sales,
advertising, ratings, and the handling of claims.' 48 State regulators also
have the authority to review books and records as part of their investigatory powers. 149
The definitions of unfair trade practices are broad enough to cover a
wide variety of insurer activity.' 50 They include misrepresentations in advertising,151 applications,152 and the making of false statements or entries.' 53 Unfair trade practices also includes a wide variety of improper

140.
141.
142.
143.

See
See
See
See

id. § 12.09 [4].
id. § 12.09[10].
id. § 12.01 [2].
id. § 12.13.

144. See 2 Levine, supra note 118, § 13.04[2].
145. See id. § 13.04[2] & n.54; see also, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-441 to 461 (2002); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-815 to -819 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.951-.9641 (West
2004 & Supp. 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 507B.1-.14 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2401 to -2421 (2000 & Supp. 2009); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 375.930-.948 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 417-B:1-14
(LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-63-1 to -60 (West
2009); 40 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1171.1-.15 (West 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 568-101 to -118 (2008 & Supp. 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 4721-4726 (1993 &
Supp. 2009); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-516 to -600 (2007 & Supp. 2009).
146. See 2 Levine, supra note 118, § 13.04[3] [a].

147. See id. § 13.04[3] [b] & n.63.
148. See id. § 13.04[3][b].
149. See id. § 13.04[3] [c].
150. See generally id.

§ 13.05.

151. See id. § 13.05[2] [a].
152. See id.

§ 13.05 [2] [c].

153. See id. § 13.05[2] [d].
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sales activity,154 such as "twisting,"1 55 "churning,"' 5 6 "sliding,"I5 7 unsuitable sales,15 8 and unlawful rebating.15 9 In addition, unlawful discrimination is an unfair trade practice,' 60 and the regulations preclude such
things as redlining;1e1 boycotts, coercion and intimidation; 162 and discrimination based on physical or mental impairment.16 3 Certain kinds of
relationships between insurers and others are also precluded.164
Claims handling is regulated as part of market conduct.165 All states
have adopted some version of the NAIC Model Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act as part of unfair trade practices or as a separate statute.16 6
Unfair claims practices include misrepresentations of facts or policy provisions, failing to promptly acknowledge and communicate regarding a
claim, failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, trying to settle without
a complete statement of the coverage, unreasonable or improper delays,
and unreasonable settlement offers, among others.1 67
Although the power to regulate in this area is comprehensive, the
remedies are somewhat limited. As a general matter, penalties for violation are limited to cease and desist orders, suspension or revocation of
licenses, or fines.16 8 In addition, most administrative actions are limited
to cases where the prohibited conduct is so common or regularly used as
to amount to a business practice. State regulators "generally lack direct
authority to intervene in specific cases." 169 In some states, the statutes for
154. See generally id. § 13.05[3].
155. See id. § 13.05[3] [b]. Twisting occurs when an agent or broker uses misrepresentations to convince a policyholder to cancel an existing policy and replace

it with another. See id. As a result, the policyholder will forfeit certain rights or be
subject to less favorable terms. See id.
156. See id. § 13.05[3] [c]. Churning involves the unnecessary replacement of
existing policies; the agent profits by collecting additional first-year commissions.
See id. Churning often involves rewriting with a new policy, but also includes using
policy values in an existing policy to purchase another policy without fully informing the policyholder of the consequences. See id.
157. See id. § 13.05[3] [d]. Sliding occurs when agents coerce policyholders to
purchase ancillary insurance products without informed consent. The agents misrepresent the insurance product as coverage that is required by law or fail to inform the policyholder of all applicable charges. See id.
158. See id. § 13.05[3] [e].
159. See id. § 13.05[3] [h].
160. See generally id. § 13.05 [4].
161. See id. § 13.05[4][b].
162. See id. § 13.05[4] [c].
163. See id. § 13.05[ 4 ][g].
164. See generally id. § 13.05 [7].
165. See generally id. § 13.05[5].
166. See id. § 13.05[5] [a] & n.194.
167. See id. § 13.05[5] [a].
168. See id. § 13.04[3][e].
169. Id. § 13.05 [5] [a].
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market conduct may provide a private right of action,1 70 but courts have
been reluctant to infer such a right of action. 171
6.

Solvency

One of the most important areas of state regulation addresses insurer
solvency. This has been one of the more successful areas of regulation.17 2
State regulators use their comprehensive regulatory powers to supervise
insurer solvency. They have a broad range of financial and analytical tools
available. 173 Insurers are to submit to regular financial examinations,' 7 4
and if the insurer is at risk of becoming insolvent, the state regulators have
authority to intervene.17 5 State regulators may require more frequent financial reports,1 76 and if the situation requires, the regulators may take
control of the insurer through administrative supervision.17 7
C.

The National Association of Insurance Commissioners

This comprehensive regulatory framework has given rise to an important quasi-governmental insurance organization, the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). This organization is "quasi-governmental" because its members are state insurance commissioners, who are
government officials, but the association itself is self described as a "voluntary organization"1 7 8 that is organized under the corporate laws of Delaware. 179 It was organized in 1871, which it claims makes it the oldest
170. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.155(1)(a), 626.941(1)(i) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2010).
171. See generally 2 Levine, supra note 118, § 13.06.
172. See Macey & Miller, supra note 59, at 18-19. Macey and Miller have
noted:
[T] he overall level of insurance company insolvencies has been extraordinarily low, and the insolvencies that have occurred frequently have been
triggered by unforeseeable downturns in real estate and corporate debt
markets.
... Moreover, the federal government certainly has not acquitted itself
well in the analogous field of banking regulation.
Id.
173. See generally 2 Hernandez & Waters, supra note 49, § 14.04 (describing
IRIS ratios, FAST scoring system, RBC ratios, Risk-Focused analysis, rating agencies, and Early Warning Systems).
174. See id. § 14.04[8]. Generally, it is once every three years, but occasionally
it is on a five-year cycle. See id.
175. See generally id. § 14.05.
176. See id. § 14.05 [1].
177. See id. § 14.05 [4].
178. See NAT'L Ass'N OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 2
(2009) [hereinafter NAIC ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.naic.org/
documents/about 2008_annual-report.pdf. Professor Randall has concluded that
"the NAIC is a private rather than a governmental entity." See Randall, supra note
77, at 638.
179. See Bylaws of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
http://www.naic.org/members-bylaws.htm (last visited May 23, 2010).
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association of state officials.' 80 The NAIC generated some $68 million in
revenue in 2008, of which about $2 million came from state assessments.18 In 2008, its staff included 430 employees, 182 and its operations
budget was more than $66 million.' 8 3
The stated purpose of the NAIC is "to assist state insurance regulators,
individually and collectively, in serving the public interest and achieving
... fundamental insurance regulatory goals in a responsive, efficient and
cost effective manner."18 4 While the mission no longer explicitly states it
is to promote uniformity,18 5 that is what the NAIC means by its reference
to efficient and cost effective regulation.' 8 6
The NAIC is playing a facilitating role that might be similar to a central federal agency. It creates model laws and regulations, prepares standardized forms, coordinates financial examinations, maintains extensive
national databases to assist in monitoring insurers, trains many state regulators, and prepares statistical reports.' 8 7 The NAIC performs these tasks
strictly from the state regulatory paradigm. Professor Randall, in her study
of the NAIC, found "a recurring pattern of regulatory behavior: a crisis
precipitates threatened federal intervention, and in response to such
threats, the NAIC, working with the industry, proposes, but only partially
accomplishes, a program of centralized reform."' 8 8
This pattern, and the political power and lobbying influence of the
NAIC, will make it very difficult to obtain new federal regulation of insurance. A couple of historical examples illustrate this point. Problems with
collusion and price fixing gave rise to federal intervention into insurance
regulation in the 1940s by Department of Justice efforts to enforce the
antitrust laws. When the Supreme Court in South-Eastern Undenriters upheld that intervention, 89 the NAIC's response was swift and powerful.' 9 0
A year later, the NAIC's draft legislation was passed by both the House and
180. See NAIC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note

178.

181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Our Mission, http://

www.naic.org/indexabout.htm# (last visited May 23, 2010).
185. Prior to 1980, the NAIC said that the "object of this association shall be
to promote uniformity in legislation affecting insurance." See NAT'L ALLIANCE OF
AMERICAN INSURERS, NAIC IN TRANSITION: A DiscussioN PAPER ON ISSUES FACING
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 13 (1982).
186. The more opaque version of the mission was adopted in 1980. As Professor Randall points out, the goal of uniformity was inconsistent with state regulation, and even the existence of the organization. See Randall, supranote 77, at 634-

35.
187. See id. at 636-37.

188. Id. at 640.
189. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552 (1944).
190. See Randall, supra note 77, at 633 & n. 50.
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the Senate and became the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 19' That was not all.
The NAIC then created the model legislation for unfair trade practices
that allowed states to avoid federal regulation under the antitrust laws,
which most states adopted in the following years.192
A more contemporary example arose out of the insurance crisis of the
1980s. After several large insurers became insolvent, federal officials criticized state insurance solvency regulation.19 3 Federal legislation was introduced to address the state regulatory weaknesses in the insolvency area.194
The NAIC responded by creating an accreditation process seeking to improve individual state insurance departments. 9 5 Although some states
criticized the accreditation process, resulting in some relaxing of accreditation standards, the NAIC was able to forestall federal regulation in this
area.' 9 6
D.

Lessons to Be Learned

What these examples show is the formidable power of the NAIC to
protect the state paradigm of regulation.' 9 7 This is reflected in the current round of reform proposals. Although some have used the AIG collapse as a basis to call for the optional federal charter proposal,19 8 it
should be noted that the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, a major
part of the administration's proposed reform package,' 9 9 does not apply
to most insurance. 20 0 Similarly, while the effort to create a Federal Insur191. See id. at 633-34; see also KENNETH

J. MEIER, THE POLYTICAL EcoNov OF

68-69 (1988).
192. See Randall, supra note 77, at 634.

REGULATION: THE CASE OF INSURANCE

193. See id. at 642; see also, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INSURANCE REGULATIONS: STATE HANDLING OF FINANCIALLY TROUBLED PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSUR-

ERS, GAO/GGD-89-129

(1991); STAFF OF THE H. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND

INVESTIGATIONS OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES (1990).

101ST

CONG., FAILED

194. See Randall, supra note 77, at 644.

195. See id. at 645-46.
196. See id. at 657-58.
197. See generally Randall, supra note 77.
198. For further discussion of the proposals for the optional federal charter,
see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. The NAIC, of course, opposes the
optional federal charter. See, e.g., Press Release, NAIC, NAIC President Questions
Motives of OFC Supporters (Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.naic.org/
Releases/2008_docs/president-questions ofc supporters.htm.
199. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION

AND REGULATION 50-75 (2009),

available at http://www.financial

stability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf.
200. See, e.g., Arthur D. Postal, New Reg System Proposed, NAT'L UNDERWRITER,
July 6, 2009, at 10; Press Release, NAMIC, Moore-Paulsen Amendment Provides
Clarity to CFPA Legislation (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://www.namic.org/
newsreleases09/091021nrl.asp; see also Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2009,

H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. § 101 (18) (0) (2009) (providing that CFPA "shall not define engaging in the business of insurance as a financial activity (other than with
respect to credit insurance, mortgage insurance, or title insurance, as described in
this section)").
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ance Office has gained momentum,2 0 1 the NAIC recently obtained con202
To the extent that
cessions to the proposal to protect state regulation.
other reform measures intend to include insurance, passing such measures will require overcoming or addressing the NAIC.
The second lesson to be learned is that the state regulatory system is
comprehensive and robust. It would be folly to act as if there is little or no
regulation of insurance. Moreover, because state regulation of insurance
has more than 100 years of history, valuable lessons have been learned that
20 3
While state
should be considered in connection with reform efforts.
comprehensive
a
it
provides
limitations,
some
has
certainly
regulation
framework and regulatory apparatus with extensive experience and expertise. Reform of insurance regulation needs to take this into account.

III.

STATE JUDICIAL REGULATION OF INSURANCE

In addition to state administrative regulation, insurance law includes
a considerable regulation through state common law. Although most peo-

ple who study regulation might not consider the common law as a source
of regulation, that would be a mistake in the case of insurance. Indeed, in
some respects the common law regulation of insurance through the courts
204
Insurance law
may be more important than administrative regulation.
casebooks generally include some discussion of administrative regulation,
but it is a relatively small percentage. 20 5 The common law regulation of
201. See, e.g., Sean P. Carr, Obama Plans Class for FederalInsurance Office, Stops
Short of Federal Regulator, BESTWIRE, June 17, 2009; Sean P. Carr, Insurers Welcome
17, 2009, http://www.trading
Obama Regulatory Plan, TRADINGMARKETS.COM,77 June
6 3 8 /.
markets.com/.site/news/Stock%20News/23
202. See Arthur D. Postal, Revamped U.S. Insurance Office Bill Clears House Hurdle, Draws Industry Praise,NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Dec. 7, 2009, at 8 (noting that bill
"now contains specific language denying the new agency any supervisory or regulatory authority over the business of insurance, while barring the FIO from preempting state insurance laws governing rates, premiums, coverage requirements,
antitrust laws, underwriting or sales practices").
203. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 59, at 17-20 (recommending that
current interpretations of McCarran-Ferguson be followed with regard to antitrust
exemption, that solvency regulation be left to states, and that prices should be

deregulated).
204. As will be discussed more fully below, the benefit of the common law
remedies is that they are available to every consumer. While every consumer also
can make an administrative complaint, after making the complaint the consumer
has no influence or control over the matter. Moreover, the administrative remedies generally do not provide any specific relief for individual insureds. See 2 Levine, supra note 118, § 13.05[5] [a] (noting "state insurance departments generally
lack direct authority to intervene in specific cases where an insurer is alleged to act
in an unfair manner").
205. For example, one casebook devotes the last 84 pages out of more than
700 to insurance regulation. See Tom BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY- CAsEs
AND MATEIUALs 637-721 (2d ed. 2008). Another casebook puts insurance at the
beginning, but it only devotes 34 out of 788 pages to insurance. See LEO P. MARTINEZ & JOHN WHELAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANcE LAW 24-58 (5th ed.
2006).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 8

796

VILIANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55: p. 773

insurance has created a remedy when insurers act in bad faith. My suggestion is that as part of financial regulatory reform a similar consumer remedy should be considered.
A.

Insurers Are Liablefor Acting in Bad Faith

One major common law doctrine that allows state judicial regulation
of insurance is the doctrine of "bad faith." 20 6 This doctrine makes insurers liable for damages beyond those promised in the policy when their
conduct amounts to bad faith. 20 7 The term "bad faith" is really a misnomer because the doctrine in its modern form has little to do with the insurer's state of mind. 208 Instead, it is a shorthand way of referring to
conduct which gives rise to extracontractual damages. 20 9 Bad faith conduct is generally regarded as a tort and therefore gives rise to somewhat
more generous tort remedies, including any foreseeable losses, emotional
distress, 21 0 and in some cases, punitive damages. 21 '
The doctrine of bad faith in insurance law arose out of cases involving
third-party liability insurance whereby an insurer has agreed to defend
and indemnify the insured for certain claims.2 12 Liability insurance is generally subject to policy limits for the amount that the insurer will pay
under the policy. When an insurer is defending its insured against a thirdparty claim, the insurer also has a duty to respond to settlement offers.2 13
A common tactic for claimants is to offer to settle for policy limits. From a
straight contract standpoint the insurer has little reason to accept such a
settlement offer because it represents the insurer's maximum exposure in
the case. 2 14 Why should an insurer settle for the full amount when the
trial of the case could reduce or eliminate the liability?
206. See STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAffH AcnoNs: LIABILIrY AND DAMAGES §
(2d ed. 1997).
207. See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967).

1:01

208. See generallyJeffrey E. Thomas, A Case Study of Bad FaithRefusal to Settle: A
Doctrinal, Normative and PracticalAnalysis of Missouri Law, 64 UMKC L. REv. 695,
711-12 (1996) (discussing limitations of state-of-mind approach to bad faith).
209. See ASHLEY, supra note 206, § 1:02.
210. For a discussion of the history and use of emotional distress damages in
bad faith cases, see Jeffrey E. Thomas, Crisci v. Security Insurance Company: The
Dawn of the Modern Era of Insurance: Bad Faith and EmotionalDistress Damages, 2 NEV.
L.J. 415 (2002).
211. See ASHLEY, supra note 206, §1:02.
212. See id. § 2:02.
213. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113, 1114 (1990).
214. The one exception to this would be where the liability seems clear and
the defense's costs, which in general are not subject to policy limits, will be substantial. In such a case the insurer may accept a policy-limits settlement to avoid
incurring substantial defense costs. While this defense-costs scenario will sometimes occur, a more likely scenario is where the insured has a possible defense in
the case. When there is a possible defense, taking the case to trial holds out the
possibility of a lesser verdict, or even a defense verdict. In such a scenario, there is
little incentive for the insurer to accept a policy-limits settlement. See ASHLEY, Supra
note 206, § 2:02.
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The problem with this approach is that it undervalues the interest of
the insured. From the insured's standpoint, a settlement offer within the
policy limits avoids any individual liability for the insured. This is a significant benefit, especially when the insured is facing exposure beyond the
policy limits. 2 15 An insurer, who is controlling the defense, has little incentive under the contract to accept the policy limits settlement, but the
insured has a strong interest in accepting such an offer. 216
The courts responded to this scenario by creating a liability rule for
insurers under certain circumstances. The courts have found that each
insurance policy includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that this covenant provides the basis for a tort claim for its violation.2 17 It has been somewhat difficult for the courts to decide exactly
what conduct amounts to "bad faith" in the settlement scenario. One view
is that the insurer has an obligation to balance its interests with those of
the insured, and if in rejecting the settlement the insurer fails to sufficiently protect that insured's interest, it is liable for bad faith. 218 Another
view is that the insurer only has to accept reasonable settlements. If the
settlement is unreasonable, then the insurer's rejection of it is not in bad
faith.2 19 A commonly accepted, but not universal, method for evaluating
the reasonableness of the settlement is to consider whether an insurer
would accept such an offer if there were no policy limits. 220
While the bad faith doctrine developed in the context of third-party
1
insurance, it moved fairly quickly into the realm of first-party insurance.2 2
Nevertheless, because the basis for such liability was not quite as compelling, courts in only about half of the states have adopted the bad faith
doctrine in first-party cases. 222 In addition to the common law remedy for
bad faith, some states have a statutory remedy that awards attorney's fees
and a statutory penalty if an insurer unreasonably refuses to pay a
claim. 223 In Missouri, for example, an insurer who refused to pay a claim
"without reasonable cause or excuse" is subject to a possible penalty of
215. See Syverud, supra note 213, at 1128-30.
216. See id. at 1130.
217. See id.

218. See, e.g., Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 85 (Kan. 1990); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 265 (Miss. 1988).
219. See Syverud, supra note 213, at 1123.
220. See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967); Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibilityfor Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1136, 1148
(1954). I argue that this approach is underinclusive and that the better approach
is the balancing of interest. See Thomas, supra note 208, at 717-18.
221. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973); Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
222. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS S. RiCHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw § 25G[b] (4th ed. 2007).
223. See id. § 25G[d] [3]; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-256 (2000); Mo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 375.420 (West 2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-124(c) (2009).
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twenty percent for the first $1,500, and ten percent of the remainder, plus
a reasonable attorney's fee.2 24
B.

FinancialRegulatory Reform Should Consider Consumer Remedies

Experience with insurance bad faith law suggests that those involved
in financial services regulatory reform might want to consider a similar
kind of remedy. In particular, what I am suggesting is a private right of
action that would allow consumers to use the courts to get relief from
improper actions by financial institutions.
The primary benefit of this approach is to enlist the enforcement assistance of consumers nationwide. Regardless of the staffing and funding
for a regulatory agency, it will always have limited enforcement resources.
In the case of insurance regulation, the enforcement resources are typically an office with a modest staff in the department of insurance. It is
somewhat difficult to get exact numbers, but in Missouri, the Department
of Insurance, which was recently merged into a Department of Insurance,
Financial Institutions and Professional Registration, 22 5 had 534 full-time
employees in 2008.226 Only a relatively small percentage of this staff handles consumer complaints. The organization chart for the Missouri department showed only three out of forty-eight people as directly involved
in consumer complaints. 22 7 The department received some 26,000 complaint phone calls in 2008, and handled 3,812 formal complaints. 22 8
Those are not insignificant numbers, but they are relatively small considering the millions of insureds in Missouri.
California, the largest state, may have the largest insurance department, but it also faces limited resources. In 2008, it had only 106 full-time
staff working on consumer complaints. 229 That is only eight percent of
the 1,336 staff that are authorized by law, 230 presumably because of
budget difficulties faced by the state and the department. A staff of 106
can only handle a limited number of claims. The annual complaint report
for auto insurance, for example, shows a total of 384 justified complaints
in 2008 on more than twenty-two million insurance policies. 23 1
224. See Mo. REv.

STAT.

§ 375.420.

225. See Mo. DEP'T OF INs.,

2008 ANNUAL

REPORT, available at http://

insurance.mo.gov/Contribute%20Documents/2008AnnualReport.pdf.
226. See id. at 3.

227. See id. at 15. This is about six percent of the management staff. Using
that percentage as a basis for estimating the total staff for consumer complaints,
the full-time employees working on consumer complaints would be about thirtythree.
228. See id. at 3.
229. See CA. DEP'T OF INS., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE COMMIS-

SIONER 115 (2009),

available at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0200-

studies-reports/0 7 00-commissioner-report/upload/2008CDIAnnualReport.pdf.
230. See id.

231. See California Department of Insurance, Consumers: Auto Complaint
Composite Page, http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0100-consumers/0040-studies-
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National insurance complaint data is generally consistent with this
analysis of Missouri and California. 232 Regulators receive and handle consumer complaints, but the scale is relatively modest considering the size of
the market. 23 3 A national report prepared by the NAIC showed approximately 131,000 consumer complaints received in 2009 by state insurance
departments. 234 Of this number, only eighty-five complaints resulted in
fines. 235 The most common resolution was for the insurance department
to provide additional information (21,462 cases, plus another 13,260 cases
where the department advised the complainant), followed by settlements
in 19,292 cases. 23 6 The insurance company's position was upheld or the
company was found in compliance in 10,123 cases. 23 7
These simple descriptive statistics raise some questions about the efficacy of administrative regulation to protect consumers. Although it is difficult to obtain statistical information on the frequency of bad faith claims,
the availability of the bad faith remedy is a tool that can be used by any
claimant dissatisfied with his or her settlement. This at least increases the
scope of possible claims, and the potential number of actions seeking to
enforce legal requirements. The threat of such action, if the sanctions are
sufficient, can be a significant incentive to provide better service to consumers. Two studies have suggested that bad faith liability increases claim
settlements. One study, done with data from uninsured and underinsured
motorist claims, found a significant positive effect of bad faith liability on
settlements. 2 38 A second study looking at auto insurance cases found that
bad faith liability had a significant effect on settlements, increasing the
reports/0020-complaint-study/AutomobileComposite.cfm (last visited May 23,
2010).
232. Two more state examples are discussed by Professor Randall, Indiana
and Colorado, and in both cases the limited staff raises questions about the ability
to protect consumers. See Randall, supra note 77, at 661-62.
233. The premium volume in the United States in 2008 was $1.239 trillion.
See World Insurance in 2008, SIGMA (Swiss Re, Zurich, Switz.), 2009, at 7 tbl.III (providing statistical appendix update), available at http://www.swissre.com/
resources/c432ca8040822291b447f47869f3fb71-sigma3-2009_APPENDIXDEC_
09.pdf. The industry has more than 3,800 insurers who employ about 2.3 million
people. See Insurance Information Institute, Industry Overview, http://www.iii.
org/media/facts/statsbyissue/industry/ (last visited May 23, 2010).
234. See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Reasons Why
Closed Confirmed Consumer Complaints Were Reported, https://eapps.naic.org/
documents/cis-aggregate-complaints-by-reason-codes.pdf (last visited May 23,
2010).
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See Mark J. Browne, Ellen S. Pryor & Bob Puelz, The Effect of Bad-Faith
Laws on First-PartyInsuranceClaims, 33J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 379 (2004) (finding that
"model explained 46% of the variation in damage size in the economic-damagesonly model, 47% in the noneconomic-damages-only model, and 59% of the variation in the total-damages model").
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value of the settlement from twenty-one to fifty-two percent.23 9 The same
study also found that bad faith liability reduced the possibility of underpayment, defined as the payment of less than the economic loss. 2 4 0
What I am suggesting is that financial regulatory reform should consider allowing consumers to bring their own actions to enforce regulatory
requirements. This substantially increases the enforcement resources, and
allows those consumers who are injured to obtain relief with less governmental resources. I do not have a specific recommendation to make as to
the substantive content for such claims. I am simply pointing out that
consumer remedies developed through state common law have a meaningful effect on insurer behavior and, based on this experience in insurance, that reform in financial regulation generally should consider
allowing consumers to enforce legal requirements directly through private
rights of action.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The financial crisis and the collapse of AIG certainly suggest that
something is amiss in the regulatory environment in the United States.
Nevertheless, that "something" is not insurance regulation. While state
insurance regulation can certainly be improved, problems or weaknesses
in the system did not lead to either the demise of AIG or the financial
crisis. AIG was brought to the brink of disaster by overinvestment in CDS,
a hedging device which, although it transfers risk, is not insurance because
it is not designed to pool risk. While this overinvestment threatened AIG
and its subsidiaries, this really was not an insurance problem.
Because insurance was not the cause of the financial crisis or AIG's
demise, these events do not justify reform of insurance regulation. 24 1
Moreover, while it is easy enough to consider some kind of reform in the
abstract, insurance regulators are well organized and adept at protecting
the state regulation of insurance. On one hand, this is a barrier to reform.
On the other hand, the comprehensive and robust system of state regulation should be considered as part of the discussion of insurance regulation
reform. The state regulatory system has been successful in the solvency
area and may have contributions to consider for other areas of financial
regulation. In particular, state judicial regulation that has created a cause
239. See Danial P. Asmat & Sharon L. Tennyson, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Law: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Settlements 16 (Dec. 9, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1520882.
240. See id. at 19-20.
241. The editors of the New York Times go even further. They suggest that the
kind of "regulator shopping" provided by an optional federal charter for banks

actually interfered with appropriate regulation, and therefore that an optional federal charter for insurance would make matters worse rather than better. See Editorial, Regulatory Shopping, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2009, at A34, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/05/21/opinion/21thul.html?_r=2.
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of action for insurer "bad faith" conduct may suggest a model for creating
private rights of action for other financial services consumers. My goal has
not been to present a specific proposal, but rather to present a different
perspective-one that gives greater weight and consideration to states for
both administrative and judicial regulation.
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